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BEST EFFORTS AND IMPLIED
OBLIGATIONS IN PATENT LICENSES
MERL SCALES*
I. INTRODUCTION
In our competitive economy the owner of a patented invention may
benefit from the invention in several ways.
The patented invention may be used exclusively by its owner for
a period of seventeen years.' Or the patented invention may be sold
to another with the entire right, title and interest in the invention being
assigned to the purchaser.2 Or the patented invention may be licensed
3
by the owner for an agreed royalty under a contract specifying the
several agreements between the parties. The owner of the patented
invention is free to make his choice of any of the courses outlined.
Where the choice is to license the patented invention, the parties may
contract at will, if their agreements do not violate any statutes or are
against public policy. A considerable body of case law has developed
in connection with patent license agreements. This article will discuss
some of the cases in which the licensee's obligation to use his best
efforts to promote the patented invention has been in issue.
II. BEST EFFORTS
Often a licensor desires to have a clause in the agreement obligating
the licensee to use his best efforts to promote the patented invention.
This "best efforts" clause is obviously no more than an expression of
the aim of the parties in entering the agreement. However, the inclu-
sion of a "best efforts" clause may have results that neither of the
parties to the agreement expected or desired.
The classic case4 on "best efforts" in patent license agreements is
Eclipse Bicycle Co. v. Farrow.5 This case involved an action for an
acounting for royalties by one Farrow, the patentee, against the as-
signee of his patents on an automatic mechanism for coasting and
braking bicycles. The assignee was obligated to pay royalties as speci-
fied "on all the devices made or sold embodying the invention" and to
use "due business diligence in the manufacture and sale of the devices
embodied in said letters patent, and to push the sale by all proper and
legitimate enterprise." The accounting action sought to bring within the
contract for royalty payments two devices of the same general descrip-
tion, one of which was described as the Morrow device and the other
*\Iember of Milwaukee Bar Association.
I E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70 (1902).
266 Stat. 810, 35 U. S. C. §261 (1952).
s See note 2 supra.
4 The earliest Supreme Court case wherein the issue of best efforts was con-
sidered is Thorn Wire Hedge Co. v. Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co., 159 U. S.
423 (1895).
5 199 U. S. 581 (1905).
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referred to as Exhibit E 10. The Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia6 held that royalty was due upon both the Morrow and E 10
devices. The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes laid
down the following rule:
".. . the fact that ... The defendant took the risk of the value
of Farrow's alleged invention, even when coupled with its cove-
nant to use due business diligence in pushing their sale, did not
preclude it from using any later invention, if one were made
which superceded Farrow's and did not embody it. Due business
diligence would not require it to enter into a hopeless contest,
and would not prevent it from avoiding such a contest by pur-
chase. In that event it would not be accountable to Farrow for
royalties on the new machine."
In applying the above quoted considerations pointed out by Justice
Holmes the court analyzed the Morrow brake mechanism and con-
cluded that it was the mechanical equivalent of the Farrow invention
and was no better in operation. The construction of the E 10 mechan-
ism was also reviewed and the conclusion reached that it did not
embody the Farrow invention and was a superior or better device.
Royalties were therefore required to be paid on the Morrow device but
not on the E 10 brake mechanism.
The rule of the Farrow case has been followed in numerous deci-
sions and is still the law.
The important point of the Farrow case is the Supreme Court
ruling that in a suit for royalties due under a contract, the claims of the
licensed patents do not have to read on the competitive device being
pushed by the licensee. To bring a device under the contract, it is
sufficient that it is the mechanical equivalent of the licensed invention
and not a superior structure. Where the issue, therefore, is a question
of royalties due under a contract and not one of infringement, the
license agreement itself will be construed and the prior art will not be
considered as limiting the licensed device. This point in the Farrow
case was particularly noted in Carbo-Frost, Inc. v. Pure Carbonic.7
In Carbo-Frost the question presented was whether certain "Harris-
burg" liquifiers for dry ice sold by the licensee required the payment
of a royalty. The contract between the parties obligated the licensee to
continually use its best efforts to promote the use of the apparatus
"covered by the license." The plaintiff contended that irrespective
of whether the liquifiers in question infringed the licensed patents the
use by the licensee of such devices required payment of royalty to pre-
vent a fraud upon the rights of the plaintiff. The court agreed with
plaintiff's contention and referring to the rule in the Farrow case said:
"That rule is that there is liability for royalties here if, and only
6 16 App. D. C. 468 (1900).
7 103 F. 2d 210 (8th Cir. 1939).
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if, the I-arrisburgs substantially embody the device here li-
censed-such similarity to be determined by a "broad compari-
son and contrast" of the two devices-and are no better. The
issue is not at all one of infringement. It is whether, broadly and
generally considered, the Harrisburgs are equivalent to the li-
censed device. One difference from an infringement issue is
that we are not here concerned with the prior art as limiting the
licensed device-the licensed device must be taken as stated in
the patent. .. "
The rule of Farrow was more recently followed by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Skinner,8 the court there
stating:
"The appellant is liable for royalties irrespective of the validity
of the claims so long as they have not been held invalid, and
irrespective of whether or not certain features of the invention
may be found in the prior art."
The court further said:
"The case is before us on the applications, drawings and speci-
fications which reveal the inventive conceptions not limited by
the rules applicable in infringement cases."
The inclusion of a best efforts clause in a license agreement may
therefore have the effect of substantially expanding the licensor's rights
to collect royalties on competitive devices. And so, under the rule an-
nunciated by the courts the licensee may even be required to pay
royalties on a device previously known in the prior art.
What, however, is a better device? Perhaps the alleged better de-
vice is only better because it has gained commercial success by an
extensive advertising and sales campaign waged by the licensee. If the
same effort had been expended to promote the licensed device com-
mensurate or even greater success might have been obtained. What is
a mechanically equivalent device? This problem has been considered
in numerous decisions. To take a simple example, if the claims of the
licensed patent are limited to a device secured together by nuts and
bolts, obviously a mechanically equivalent structure could be one held
together by screws. However, if a more complicated mechanism is
involved, the finding of mechanical equivalency becomes more difficult
and uncertain. Therefore, the exceptions to enforcement of a best
efforts clause as outlined in the Farrow case offer a wide range of
argument to the licensee upon which he may base a successful defense
if he decides to sell a truant device competitive with the licensed device.
There have been numerous decisions by both Federal and State
Courts involving express best efforts clauses in patent license agree-
ments. In Brogdex Co. v. Wolcott,9 two parties were exclusively li-
8 166 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1948).
9 101 U. S. P. Q. 94, 123 Cal. App.2d 575 (1954).
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censed to distribute a wax process for the treatment of vegetables. The
licensees were both required to "devote their full time and best efforts
... and not to engage in any business which would in any way compete
with said licensed processes." The court there held that when one of
the licensees started to work for a company selling an identical product
in direct competition to the wax of the patented process the agreement
was breached as the best efforts was personal to each of the licensees.
In International Aluminum Window Corp. v. Ferri'° the licensee
had agreed to go into commercial production of windows in acordance
with the plaintiff's invention. This he never did and the court held that
efforts on his part to induce others to manufacture and produce win-
dows without results was not in accordance with his agreement.
A case decided in favor of the party agreeing to use his best efforts
is Little Rock Surgical Co. v. Bowers."1 There the agreement provided
"that the buyer shall use its best efforts in the promotion and sale of
said product in the designated territory through its agents, represen-
tatives, correspondents and other methods at its command." The de-
cision stated that failure to comply with this clause would breach the
contract but that the facts indicated that the buyer had extensively
advertised the article in question and spent more in this effort than
the minimum agreed upon.
In some cases the best efforts clause has been attacked on the
grounds that it was too vague and indefinite. This issue was presented
in Stentor Electric Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Klaxon Com-
pany.1 2 The defendant there contended that the article of the agree-
ment providing that the defendant "will use its best efforts to further
the manufacture and sale of the article covered by the agreement, and
to that end it will maintain an efficient organization for the manufac-
ture and sale of said article" was too vague and indefinite to be en-
forceable. The court held that the complaint clearly stated a cause of
action.
An opposite conclusion, however, was reached in Daniels v. Brown
Shoe Co."3 A portion of the controversy there revolved around the
fifth clause of the agreement charged to have been broken by the li-
censee. This clause provided:
10 101 U.S.P.Q. 131, 72 So.2d 31 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1954).
1142 S.W.2d 367 (Mo. 1931).
'12 30 F. Supp. 425 (D. Del. 1939). The decision of the District Court adding inter-
est at the rate of 6% up on the jury verdict of $100,000 from the date the
action was brought which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals as mandatory
under Sec. 480 of the N. Y. Civil Practice Act was reversed by the Supreme
Court in 313 U. S. 487 (1940) ; also see 125 F.2d 820 (3rd Cir. 1942).
13 77 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1935). The court in its decision stated: "In order for a
contract to be specifically enforceable, the acts to be performed must be stated
with such precision, or be so precisely ascertainable when the contract is ap-
plied to the facts to make its enforcement a practical matter; also the acts
directed to be done must be of such character that it is practicable for a
court to oversee and compel the performance of them."
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"It is mutually agreed . . . that the licensee shall, during the life
of this agreement, exercise its best efforts to supply the public
demand for boots and shoes embodying the inventions . . . and
shall use its best efforts to create and promote such a demand.
To this end licensee agrees to cooperate with retail shoe dealers
in promoting window displays, and other advertising features,
and in other ways and manners to exploit and develop these
shoes and the sales thereof."
The court expressed the opinion that this clause did not state the
acts to be performed by the licensee with such precision as to make its
enforcement a practical matter. It further indicated that the acts di-
rected to be done must be of such character that it is practical for a
court to oversee and compel the performance of them.
The decision at best is questionable as it appears that the manner in
which the best efforts were to be exerted was clearly stated. Apparently
the court felt that the matter would need to be disposed of by a decree
which could not be performed immediately and that it would have to
continuously supervise the best efforts requirements over a long period
of time. Under the facts of the case, the position of the court seems
untenable because it would appear that at the time the court had before
it the facts on whether the best efforts clause had been breached it
could have decided the case on those facts and not concerned itself
with any future controversy on best efforts.
A best efforts clause in a patent license agreement has been speci-
fically held enforceable in Wisconsin.' 4 The clause considered provided
that "the licensee further covenants and agrees that he will as diligently
as conditions will permit push the sale of ... extinguishers in foreign
countries." The court held that the defendant was diligent under the
facts presented.
In some agreements terms corresponding to the "best eforts" ter-
minology have been employed. For example, in a Michigan case-, de-
fendant was required to use "reasonable diligence" in the manufacture
of glass cheese-safes embracing the novel features of the licensed
patents as the demands of the market required. It appeared at the time
the license was entered into and thereafter that defendant also sold
other cheese-safes than those covered by the licensed patents. The court
is placing a meaning on reasonable diligence said:
"It would be grossly unreasonable to hold defendant bound to
put these safes on any other footing than other articles kept on
sale, or to force them on the market at the expense of other in-
terests. There was no obligation to give them a preference, or to
use more than usual diligence to dispose of them. If the trade
were informed of them, and of their price, in the usual manner,
' 3Gessler v. Erwin Co. et al, 182 Wis. 315, 193 N.W. 363 (1923).
15 Forncrook Mfg. Co. v. Iron Works, 63 Mich. 195 (1886).
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then defendant fulfilled its duty by selling them when applied
for... defendant cannot be held responsible for not using extra
efforts to sell them."
III. IMPLIM OBLIGATIONS
Where the licensor proposes a best efforts clause and the licensee
agrees to accept the clause but insists upon a negative covenant speci-
fying that nothing in the agreement will require the payment of a
royalty at any time upon the marketing of a competitive or correspond-
ing device by the licensee, the licensor should consider deleting the ex-
press best efforts clause from the agreement. Since the courts have
held that there is an implied obligation on the licensee to pay royalties
on competitive devices he sells under an exclusive patent license agree-
ment, subject only to the exceptions outlined in the Farrow case, the
absence of a best efforts clause may not impair the licensor's right to
collect such royalty.
The implying of best efforts into a license agreement is based on
an equitable doctrine long applied by the courts to contracts in general.
The obligation, in fact, rests on both parties to an agreement 6 but most
of the cases appear to have considered it in connection with the party
agreeing to take a patent license or work some other property right.
This doctrine requires that where a party enters into an exclusive agree-
ment to promote a property or property right for a specified return to
be paid to the owner there is a covenant or standard of conduct or an
obligation implied that the exclusive promoter of the property will work
in good faith to make a go of it and produce the income agreed to be
paid. This doctrine was fully discussed in In re Waterson, Berlin
Snyder Co." wherein the court implied a covenant to work a copyright
so far as reasonable under the circumstances.
In line with the rule of In re Waterson it has been held, for exam-
ple, that there was an obligation to exploit the subject matter of a con-
tract in good faith where an exclusive license was granted to place the
licensor's endorsement of approval on the dress designs of others.' 8
The doctrine has been applied in an agreement to transport cargoes,'19
to sink and operate oil wells,20 to quarry stone21 and in numerous other
16 Gessler v. Erwin Co. et al, 182 Wis. 315, 193 N.W. 363 (1923).
148 F.2d 702, 709 (2d Cir. 1931). In this case involving royalty contracts with
respect to copyrights on musical compositions, the Court of Appeals after re-
viewing English and United States authorities commented: ". . . where there
has been a conveyance upon an agreement to pay the grantor sums of money
based upon the earnings of property transferred, the courts have implied a
covenant to render the subject matter of the contract productive-if the
property was a mine, a covenant to mine, quarry or drill; if it consisted of a
patent or copyright, a covenant to work the patent or copyright."
18 Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
19 Great Lakes and St. Laurence Transportation Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 239
Fed. 603 (7th Cir. 1917).
20 Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897).
21 Stoddard v. Illinois Improvement Ballast Co., 275 Ill. 199, 113 N.E. 913 (1916).
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cases.2 2 The rule, as previously noted, has been applied to both parties
to an agreement with the statement that "neither party shall do anything
which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the
other party to receive the fruits of the contract."23
The implied good faith doctrine to promote licensed patents was
applied in Caron v. Nickel Processing Corp.2 4 There the plaintiff con-
tended that the availability of his patents to the defendant was enough
to sustain his claim for compensation. The court said that ". . . there are
present circumstances indicating the application of an implied obliga-
tion on the defendant's part to use reasonable efforts to exploit the
patents." It was also applied in Driver Harris Co. v. Industrial Fur-
nace Corp.25 In that case the District Court in holding for the plaintiff
suing for recission of the patent license agreement said: "There are
numerous authorities in the state and federal courts that, where a
patent is sold to be paid for on a royalty basis, a condition is implied
that the patent will be worked to earn the stipulated royalties."
The implied good faith or best efforts rule has also been followed
in Wisconsin in Gessler v. Erwin Co. et al. In holding that the plaintiff
did not carry out his part of the agreement by dealing with another than
the licensee the Court said that "There was also an implied agreement
by both parties that neither would do any act preventing or tending to
prevent its performance." The same rule was also stated in Wisconsin
by Mr. Justice Dodge in Manning v. Gall and Kenning P. M. D. Mfg.
Co.
27
The application of an implied obligation on the licensee to use rea-
22 See Brewster v. Langyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905) ; Neenan v.
Otis Elevator, 194 Fed. 44 (2d Cir. 1912); Pritchard v. McLeod et al, Fed.
24 (9th Cir. 1913); Barnett Foundry Co. v. Crowe, 219 Fed. 450 (3rd Cir.
1915).; Diamond v. Alkali Co. v. P. C. Tomson & Co., Inc., 35 F.2d 117 (3d
Cir. 1929).
23 Uproar Co v. National Broadcasting Co., et al, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936).
24 106 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
25 12 F. Supp. 918 (W.D.N.Y. 1935).
26 See note 14 supra.
27 141 Wis. 199, 124 N.W. 291 (1910). In this case Justice Dodge said: "But the
grant from defendant to plaintiff's assignor was also a contract. It granted
an exclusive right to make, use and vend. In all contracts granting property
rights or rights of conduct, there is an implied agreement on the part of the
assignor that he will do no affirmative act to derogate from his grant. This
is implied in the very grant itself. In the nature of things it is inconceivable
that the minds of the parties have met on the basis of a grant of something
and, at the same time, on negation of that grant, in whole or in part. This
principle is very old in law and has been applied to a great variety of circum-
stances, in many cases being carried to the point of declaring to be implied
covenants going much further. The grantor or lessor of land, in absence of
statute, covenants for the quiet enjoyment of the property demised, and, even
where statutes have negatived such implication, he is still held to have
covenanted not to derogate from such grant by his own acts. A contract for
exclusive agency implies that the principal will commit no act invasive of the
exclusiveness of the agency. The grantor of an exclusive license under a




sonable efforts to exploit a patent has been held to be a question of
fact. 28 Use and ownership of a competing patent may not necessarily
constitute an implied obligation to use due diligence in working the li-
censed patent. It is a question of fact whether due diligence was exer-
cised.2 9 The fact that the processes and devices used by the defendant
were not patentable because of anticipation in the prior art do not even,
if established, meet the issue of implied obligation to promote.3 0 How-
ever, where an agreement was terminated pursuant to a statute liqui-
dating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation it was held that the
implied obligation under the contract of the defendant to do nothing to
impair the contract did not control.3 Mechanical Ice Tray Corp. v.
General Motors Corp.12 expresses the view that the implied obligation
to exploit a licensed patent in good faith is subject to the exceptions
applied in the Farrow case that the licensee is not obligated to compete
with a better device which does not embody the licensed invention.
The entire contract must be construed in determining whether an
implied obligation exists to make the subject matter of the contract
productive to the extent of payment of minimum royalties. If minimum
royalties were to be paid the parties would have expressly provided for
payment.3
In Neenan v. Otis Elevator Co.34 defendant was assigned certain
patents relating to elevators under an agreement requiring defendant to
test the patented apparatus with reasonable diligence and if such test
proved satisfactory "within such further reasonable time as is conveni-
ent to put such apparatus into practial use." The court granted recission
of the agreement because the defendant wholly neglected to place the
tested device into practical use, the court pointing out that the defend-
ant did not intend to push the introduction of the invention "in an en-
thusiastic and energetic manner" as the complainant had a right to
expect. In a case 5 involving a somewhat similar fact situation, the
court there was of the opinion that it had not been proved that the li-
censee had failed to carry out the implied obligation to in good faith
use "its reasonable and best efforts to develop, exploit, produce and
make sales" of the licensed device. A corresponding case3 6 decided by
the Minnesota Supreme Court holds that the evidence failed to estab-
28 See note 24 supra.
29 Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co., Inc. v. American Ore Reclamation Co., 44 F.
Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
30 See note 16 supra.
31 Monolith Portland Mid. Co. v. Reconstruction F. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 824(S.D. Cal. 1955), modified on question of a jury trial in 240 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.
1957), cert. denied in 354 U.S. 921 (1957).
32 144 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied in 324 U.S. 844 (1945).
'3 Tersra v. Holland Furnace Co. 73 F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1934).
34 194 Fed. 414 (2d Cir. 1912).
-5 Brawley v. Crosby Research Foundation, P. 2d 392 (1946).
36 Dennis Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co. et al, 114 1%,inn. 167 (1911).
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lish that the patented device was of practical or commercial value, and
failed to establish a fraudulent purpose to withhold the patented device
from the market.
In a case in West Virginia where an action was brought to recapture
the use of certain patents, processes and inventions the demurrer of the
defendant was overruled and the court held that the plaintiff was en-
titled to "a bona fide effort" to have his inventions promoted. 7 The
fact that the license was exclusive was persuasive in the matter. A
covenant to render a process productive has been held to be plainly
implied . 3
The courts, however, are not all in accord with the implied obliga-
tion viewpoint. For example, in a case3 9 wherein the complainant as-
signed his interest in his application for two patents to the defendant
who agreed to build machines embodying "said inventions or some
of them" and to pay a stated royalty thereon it was held that the de-
fendant was not bound in terms or by implication of any requirement
to manufacture and sell machines embodying complainants' inventions
in any particular number, or for any particular time, or after a super-
seding invention arose, or after it became for any reason, a poor busi-
ness proposition for the defendant to do so and it was stated ". . . the law
implies no such provisions in the contract." This decision is contrary
to most of the law on the proposition. The majority view favors an
obligation, whether express or implied, on the licensee to use his "best
efforts" or "reasonable efforts" or "reasonable diligence" to promote
the licensed device where the agreement is exclusive. Such an exclusive
agreement under equitable considerations cannot become a burial
ground for licensor's patented invention but rather the agreement must
be given life and substance.
IV. MISUSE
The implied obligation or best efforts concept is the result of the
court's interest in seeing that the equities of the agreement between the
parties are considered irrespective of the express terms of the agree-
ment. If the parties do not desire the concept to be applied to a particu-
lar fact situation they can expressly provide in their agreement against
application of the concept. For example, it can be stated in the agree-
ment that the license does not prevent the use of any prior art devices
corresponding to the licensed device.
When it is considered that the implied obligation doctrine is court
made and based on the equities of the parties' agreement, the court may
go beyond the agreement and consider the rights of the public. There-
3 De Stubner v. Microid Process, 6 S.E. 2d 777 (1939).
38 Matzka Corporation v. Kelly Dry-Pure Juice Corp. et al, 168 AtI. 70, 19 Del.
Ch. 359 (1933).39 Briggs v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 92 N.J.Q. 277, 144 Atl. 538 (1920).
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fore, if application of the implied good faith concept would result in
the licensee being prevented from selling a device previously known in
the prior art under the Carbo-Frost interpretation of the Farrow case,
would this constitute such a misuse of the licensed patent as to make
the court feel that the implied obligation concept could not be so ex-
tended ?
It is now generally recognized that a patent may not be employed
to prevent the manufacture, purchase or sale of an unpatented device.40
In Mechanical Ice Tray Corp. v. General Motors Corp.41 the court
went along with the settled law that the implied obligation to promote a
patent in good faith is subject to the exceptions applied in the Farrow
case that the licensee is not obligated to compete with a better device
which does not embody the licensed invention. The court there, how-
ever, expressed doubt that the obligation of an exclusive licensee to
promote the licensed invention survived in a practical sense in view of
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.42 A majority of the
court did not believe a decision was necessary on the point, but there is
some indication in the case that under certain circumstances the court
would require the parties to follow a standard of conduct which would
be fair and equitable irrespective of the Mercoid case.
The Supreme Court in Mercoid barred relief to the plaintiff because
it was seeking to expand the patent to unpatented devices. It was
pointed out that the patent was a privilege conditioned by a public pur-
pose and that a patent ". . . results from invention and is limited to the
invention which it defines." Since the Mercoid case was a suit for con-
tributory infringement and not one to recover royalties under an agree-
ment, the Mercoid decision should not prevent the application of the
implied obligation doctrine to include within the agreement royalty
payments for a prior art device.
In those license agreements where express provisions have been
included requiring the licensee to abstain from manufacturing any kind
of a competing device except those covered by the licensed patent, the
courts have taken the position that the patentee was using the lawful
monopoly granted by the patent as a means of suppressing the manu-
facture and sale of competing unpatented articles.43 In Park-in-Thea-
tres v. Paramount Richards Theatres," the plaintiff argued that an
exclusive licensee is under an implied obligation to exploit the patent
in good faith and to refrain from using competing devices. There was
also an express provision in the license agreement preventing defendant
40 Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
41 See note 32 supra.
42320 U.S. 661 (1944).
43 National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garnett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir.
1943).
4490 F. Supp. 730 (D. Del. 1958) ; cert. denied in 185 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1950).
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from employing a competitive device. The court stated that this ex-
press covenant made the agreement unenforceable under the Lock-
washer45 decision and that the implied obligation to exploit could only
have existed because of the contract which was unenforceable due to
violation of public policy. The last two cited cases raise a serious ques-
tion as to whether the Carbo Frost interpretation of the Farrow deci-
sion as previously pointed out in this article would ever be carried so
far as to include for royalty payment within a license agreement a prior
art device.
However, there is another side of the matter that also must be con-
sidered. If interpretation of the license agreement is based on a broad
consideration of the effect on the public interest, then the court must
see that the public is sold the best device. Thus if an exclusive licensee
does not act in good faith to exploit the licensed device but instead sells
another device which is directly competitive with the patented device
but not within the bounds of the licensed patent, then he is able to keep
the licensed device off the market. This action would actually deprive
the public of the benefit of the patent and possibly of a better device.
The rationale of the Park-In-Theatres and the Lockwasher cases should
not be drawn so fine as to carry the doctrine there announced to an
unpatented prior art device where the conduct of the licensee is clearly
unfair and inequitable as between the parties to the license and possibly
injurious to the public in general. In those situations royalties should
be required on the prior art device. The courts appear to have followed
this rule in the past and it is doubtful that it will be changed in view of
decisions such as the Lockwasher case because of the wide latitude
resting in the courts to consider the equities of the parties and the
public.
If a licensee enters into an agreement with the intent, and his intent
would seem to be indicated by his lack of promotion of the licensed
invention, not to exploit the licensed invention but merely to keep the
licensed device off the market, there is an element of fraud or illegality
present in the agreement which might support an implied obligation to
bring the competitive prior art device under the contract if it was a
substantial equivalent and no better than the licensed device. An ex-
press covenant to cancel a license contract was enforced in National
Clay Products Co. v. Heath Unit Tile Co.4 6 where by fraudulent state-
ments the licensee had obtained a license to manufacture a product and
did nothing with it in order to prevent competition with licensee's own
product.
V. SUMMARY
Should a best efforts provision be employed in a patent license
45 See note 43 supra.
46 40 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1930).
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agreement it is obvious from the decisions that the provision must
specifically describe the best efforts required so that it is practical for
a court to oversee and compel performance. Recognition should be
given to the fact that the best efforts requirement will not be breached
if the licensee proceeds to sell a competitive device which is better and
does not embody the licensed invention. In those agreements where the
best efforts provisions will be limited by a negative covenant considera-
tion should be given to deletion of the best efforts clause completely
and reliance placed on the implied obligation resting on both parties to
do nothing which would abrogate the provisions of the contract. Such
an implied obligation may bring under the contract competitive devices
which in fact are old in the prior art but which might be eliminated by
including negative limitations in a best efforts provision. An express
negative covenant in an agreement deliberately entered into excludes
the possibility of an implied covenant of a different or contradictory
nature."
Whether misuse is in the picture, due to the licensor attempting to
collect royalties or rescind an agreement on the basis of employment by
the licensee of a prior art device which is no better and embodies the
invention, appears to depend upon the intent of the licensee. If the
facts establish that he entered into the agreement merely to remove the
patented device from the market this would seem to be against public
policy and a fraud on the licensor. In such cases it is submitted the
equities would favor a decision for the licensor.
4- Brimmer v. Union Oil Co. of California, 81 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1936)
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